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(EUROPEAN) STARS OR (AMERICAN)
STRIPES: ARE THE EUROPEAN COURT OF
HUMAN RIGHTS' NEUTRALITY AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S WALL OF SEPARATION
ONE AND THE SAME?
ANDREA PINt
INTRODUCTION
This Article traces the different approaches to religious
freedom that the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR")
and the United States Supreme Court have adopted. Although it
is difficult to summarize the various tests and trends that have
been developed by the Supreme Court, this Article highlights
some important doctrinal differences between the Supreme Court
and the ECHR.
Part I of this Article briefly surveys the dynamic role of the
U.S. Constitution and of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention"). This Part sets the groundwork for the
comparison between the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court,
which is part of a sovereign country, and the jurisprudence of the
ECHR, which was established by a large number of sovereign
European states through the international treaty that created
the European Convention.'
t Lecturer of Public Comparative Law at the University of Padua in Italy,
Faculty of Law. In drafting this Article I took advantage of the terrific expertise of
John Witte Jr., Russell Hittinger, lain Benson, Marta Cartabia, and Lorenza Violini.
At the Conference, it was extremely important to receive comments from Mark
Movsesian and Marc DeGirolami, whose generosity and commitment was amazing,
as well as from Brett Sharffs and Rosemary Salomone. This Article is dedicated to
Marshall Francesco Silvani, who passed away recently. The author can be reached
at andrea.pin@unipd.it.
1 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 32, opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (Council of Europe)
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter European Convention] ("The
jurisdiction of the Court shall extend to all matters concerning the interpretation
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Part II examines the prevailing American interpretations of
religious freedom. This Part is necessarily short, but it
nonetheless provides some idea of the various rationales that
support the protection of religious liberty in the United States.
Part III explores the ECHR's conception of religious freedom
and in particular the separation of church and state that ECHR
endorses.
The Article concludes by considering the similarities and
differences between the two models of protection of religious
freedom. The two models diverge significantly, even though both
of them can be characterized as embodying a conception of
"separation of church and state." The crucial divergence between
the two interpretations derives from an entirely different view of
the purpose of separation.
I. THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF FREEDOM OF
RELIGION PROVISIONS AND OF THE ROLE OF THE COURTS
The American constitutional experiment has gone through
an impressive evolution.2  That evolution has affected the
interpretation of the constitutional text of the First Amendment's
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses,' provisions whose
meanings have changed with the passage of time.4
Though scholars disagree about the proper interpretation of
the First Amendment, none could reasonably disagree about
certain basic facts.' The Free Exercise and Establishment
Clauses were initially intended to provide the states with at least
a certain space of self-determination in the field of religious
freedom.6 Therefore, there is little doubt about one point: some
and application of the Convention and the protocols thereto which are referred to it
as provided in Articles 33, 34 and 47.").
2 See Daniel 0. Conkle, The Path of American Religious Liberty: From the
Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future, 75 IND. L.J. 1, 1-2
(2000).
3 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . .
4 See Conkle, supra note 2, at 5-6.
6 See generally PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 8-9
(2002) (mentioning disagreement among scholars).
6 Id. at 78, 88.
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freedom of religion was accorded to states. The states were
protected from federal intrusions and accorded some role in
shaping their own relationship with religion.'
Once the First Amendment was incorporated by the
Supreme Court as against the states, it was individuals, rather
than states, who were the object of its protection.8 The First
Amendment as interpreted by the Court is now understood as
protecting religious freedom for everybody throughout the United
States and as preventing any state from establishing a state
religion.' This evolution has played a crucial role in shaping the
contemporary regime of religious freedom in America.o In fact,
the United States has a strong common-religious freedom
framework precisely because of the Supreme Court's post-
incorporation decisions.n
Just as the understanding of the First Amendment has
evolved, so too, have the European Convention and its court
undergone an impressive evolution,12 which will portend their
increased presence and role within the constitutional systems of
the European countries. 3 The ECHR has already gone quite a
long way toward protecting fundamental rights throughout
Europe. 4 The ECHR is a highly respected tribunal, and its
jurisprudence has influenced the law of many European
countries, leading them to a more uniform interpretation of their
own fundamental rights. This phenomenon resembles the
Id. at 434-39.
Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Federalism and Faith, 56 EMORY L.J. 19, 21
(2006).
9 HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 439.
10 Conkle, supra note 2, at 6-12.
n Id.
12 See, e.g., Marta Cartabia, La Costituzione italiana e l'universalita dei diritti
umani 4 (2008) (It.), available at http://www.astrid-online.it/rassegna/Rassegna-
25/30-04-2008/Cartabia_-Lincei_-10_1_2008---def.pdf.
13 See generally Angela Colella, Verso un diritto comune delle libert6 in europa
(2007) (It.), available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/
stories/pdf/nuovi%20pdf/Paper/0023 colella.pdf; Bruno Nascimbene & Alessandra
Lang, Il Trattato di Lisbona: l'Unione europea a una svolta? (2007) (It.), available at
http-//www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/stories/pdf/documenti forum/paper/
0028_nascimbenelang.pdf; Antonio Ruggeri, Carte internazionali dei diritti,
Costituzione europea, Costituzione nazionale: prospettive di ricomposizione delle fonti
in sistema (2007) (It.), available at http://www.forumcostituzionale.it/site/images/
stories/pdf/nuovi%20pdflPaper/0008-ruggeri.pdf.
14 STEVEN GREER, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS:
ACHIEVEMENTS, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 316 (2006).
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progressive evolution of American jurisprudence, which has led
to the creation of a unitary model of religious freedom and of
disestablishment.
The ECHR has had a robust role in leading the domestic
courts in the interpretation of their respective constitutional
rights." Nevertheless, the ECHR's role has been largely
informal, since it has generally affected the types of arguments
that have been advanced in the domestic courts without formally
altering the domestic laws themselves." The European
Convention recently became even more important as a source of
domestic law because of its insertion into the Lisbon Treaty and,
therefore, into European Union law."
The initial role of the European Convention and the ECHR
was to provide relief for individuals in the event that the states
violated any of the rights in the Convention. 8 The individual
could sue the state before the European Convention's institutions
in order to, at least, be compensated for such violation.'"
The Lisbon Treaty,2 0 which has introduced new rules for the
European Union ("E.U."), has formally embedded the European
Convention within E.U. law and therefore increased its
influential role.21 Now the principles of the European Convention
are part of E.U. law.22 The exact meaning of this reference to the
16 See Alice Izumo, Note, Diplomatic Assurances Against Torture and Ill
Treatment: European Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence, 42 COLUM. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 233, 276 (2010).
16 See Benedict Kingsbury, The Concept of 'Law' in Global Administrative Law,
20 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23, 43-44 (2009).
17 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty
Establishing the European Community art. 1, Dec. 13, 2007, O.J. (C 306) 1
[hereinafter Treaty of Lisbon].
18 Christos L. Rozakis, The Case of the European Court of Human Rights, 101
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 424,424-25 (2007).
" European Convention, supra note 1, art. 41 ("If the Court finds that there has
been a violation of the Convention or the protocols thereto, and if the internal law of
the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.").
20 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed December 13, 2007. 'treaty of Lisbon, supra
note 17.
21 Id.
22 European Convention, supra note 1, art. 1 ("The High Contracting Parties
shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in
Section I of this Convention.").
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principles of the European Convention is a matter of debate, but
there is little doubt that the principles have become part of the
law of the land for the European states, at least to some extent.
The ECHR's jurisprudence will likely have a pivotal role in
interpreting the principles of the European Convention for E.U.
institutions and E.U. law. The domestic courts of E.U. countries
will align their decisions to the ECHR's interpretation of the
European Convention. In doing so, they will adopt its model of
religious freedom.
After explaining the reasons for comparing the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence with the activism of the ECHR, it is worth
recalling the impressive evolution that has led the United States
to a distinctive model of religious freedom.24 Next, this Article
will consider the role of the ECHR in uniformly protecting
religious freedom within the European Convention's states and
will focus on the distinctive features that characterize the
religious freedom that the ECHR contemplates.
II. FREEDOM OF RELIGION: AN AMERICAN HISTORY
As a starting point, recall the role that the First Amendment
of the United States' Constitution played when it was effected.2 5
The Constitution guaranteed individuals and states cerain
protections.2 6 Specifically, the First Amendment protected
individuals from Congress's intrusions into their sphere of
freedom. The states were protected from Congress's initiative
to introduce a national official belief or to impose a uniform
attitude toward religion throughout the country. 28  The states
were accorded the right to decide their own relationship with
religion, at least partially.29
" See G. Colavitti & C. Pagotto, II Consiglio di Stato applica direttamente le
norme CEDU grazie al Trattato di Lisbona: l'inizio di un nuovo percorso?,
ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI COSTITUZIONALISTI, (Mar. 2, 2010) (It.), available at
www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.it/sites/default/files/rivista/articoli/allegati/Cola
vitti-PagottoOl.pdf.
24 See infra Part II.
25 See supra notes 2-11 and accompanying text.
26 See Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77
N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 350 (2002).
27 See JOHN WIrrTE, JR. & JOEL A. NICHOLS, RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 55-56 (3d ed. 2011).
28 See id. at 56, 109.
29 See HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 434-39.
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As scholars have noted, Establishment Clause interpretation
has evolved throughout the centuries.a0 Two main features of
this evolution can be largely ascribed to the dynamic role of
Supreme Court jurisprudence. The first is incorporation,
through which the Establishment Clause was interpreted as not
only applying to Congress but also to the individual states."
Since the Establishment Clause was to be applied to them, states
no longer had the liberty of establishing any official church. The
second evolutionary feature concerned the precise meaning
of "establishment" itself. The Establishment Clause was
interpreted as mandating a separation of church and state.3 2
Public institutions-whether Congress or the states-did not
only have to protect freedom, but they also had to remain distant
from religion.33
This important shift in the interpretation of the First
Amendment had very powerful implications for the constitutional
history of the United States. The very keystone of American
liberties,3 4 the freedom of belief, was taken away from the
states. 5 More recently, through the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act and the constitutional jurisprudence that it
prompted, the freedom of religion has returned to be a case for
federalism."* Nevertheless, the American model of religious
liberty has clearly developed a distinctive shape that can be
found throughout the country.
The shaping of a more unitary relational model between
religion and state relied on the Establishment Clause. Without
the latter, the separation between church and state could have
just been one of the many devices adopted in order to protect
religious freedom. The shaping of a unitary relational model
30 See, e.g., id. at 3; John Witte, Jr., From Establishment to Freedom of Public
Religion, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 499, 500-01 (2004).
31 The evolution is briefly described in Witte, Jr., supra note 30, at 510.
" See WITTE, JR. &. NICHOLS, supra note 27, at xxiii, 173-75 (analyzing the
interpretation of the separation between religion and state).
I See id. at 169. Needless to say, the distance between state and religion was
differently conceived through time. See generally John Witte, Jr., That Serpentine
Wall of Separation, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1869 (2003).
4 JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., THE LUSTRE OF OUR COUNTRY: THE AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 3 (1998).
35 See HAMBURGER, supra note 5, at 449.
36 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that the
enactment of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 exceeded Congress's
power).
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between church and state has brought what used to be a matter
for state policies to the federal level. The unitary protection of
religious freedom has succeeded at the expense of the freedom of
the states.
A third feature that has characterized the relationship
between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause
in American legal culture is the belief that separating the state
from religion protects religion from the state and the national
government's influence. This belief, which can be traced back
famously to the teachings of Thomas Jefferson and Roger
Williams, among the others, has played a strong part in shaping
the American conception of religious freedom. The separatist
approach is undoubtedly founded on several arguments, but
there is one that dates back to Roger Williams's thought and
remains critical today.39 The argument that religion must be
separated in order not to be poisoned by politics and the
vicissitudes of democracy has also been mentioned in recent
times-for example, during a debate about vouchers for private
schools that are run by religious foundations and associations. 0
To some extent, the idea of separation between church and state
was derived and still derives from the need to protect both
religions and individuals' religious freedom.4 1
3 See WITE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27, at 37.
38 This feature of American legal culture has been studied abroad for decades.
As for Italian scholarship, see, for example, FRANCESCO RUFFINI, LA LI3ERTA
RELIGIOSA: STORIA DELL'IDEA (Giangiacomo Feltrinelli ed., 2d ed 1992) (1901).
" See Edward J. Eberle, Roger Williams' Gift: Religious Freedom in America, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 425, 453 (1999) (discussing Williams's view that the
purity of religion must be protected by separating religion from the outside world).
For a discussion of Williams's landmark work, The Bloody Tenent, of Persecution, for
Cause of Conscience, and the separate roles of government and religion, see id. at
435, 457.
40 See, e.g., Paul Finkelman, School Vouchers, Thomas Jefferson, Roger
Williams, and Protecting the Faithful: Warnings from the Eighteenth Century and
the Seventeenth Century on the Danger of Establishments to Religious Communities,
2008 BYU L. REV. 525, 528 (using the famous teachings of Jefferson and Williams to
discuss the necessity of not funding private schools in order to protect them from the
influence of the democratic ideology).
4 Obviously, American doctrine on non-establishment is also concerned with the
threat that religion would pose on states. See WYITE, JR. & NICHOLS, supra note 27,
at 37.
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III. FREEDOM FROM RELIGION: A EUROPEAN PATTERN
The ECHR has developed its own distintive jurisprudence of
freedom of religion well beyond the mere phrasing of Article 9,
which protects that freedom.42 For example, its jurisprudence
concerning the place of religion in the public sphere, and
especially concerning religion in public education, represents
some of the ECHR's most interesting achievements. 43 The ECHR
considers public schools as environments that are sensitive both
to the exigencies of the states as well as of religions." The
jurisprudence about religion in public educational places is also
very revealing about the role of freedom of religion in the ECHR's
opinion: a protection of the states against religions. The ECHR is
therefore virtually shaping a distinctive model of relationship
between church and state based on the preference for the state
over religion.
A. How the European Court of Human Rights Is Protecting
States from Religion
The ECHR's understanding of religious freedom includes
different components roughly reducible to the following: (1) the
text of Article 9, which protects that freedom;4 5 (2) the emergence
of the idea of "neutrality"4 6 as an implicit consequence of freedom
of religion and the problems that it poses to the interpretation of
4 See discussion infra Part III.B.
* See infra text accompanying notes 48-55.
See, e.g., Dahlab v. Switzerland (dec.), no. 42393/98, ECHR 2001-V,
available at http:/cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
670930&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649 (discussing a public school teacher's right, as a representative
of the state, to wear an Islamic headscarf to school).
45 European Convention, supra note 1, art. 9.
4' This does not imply that the religious "neutrality" is absent from the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. Nevertheless, the nuance and the impact of this word are
different in the Supreme Court's and the European courts' jurisprudences. See, for
instance, Paul Finkelman's reflections concerning the display of the Ten
Commandments on public property. See generally Paul Finkelman, The Ten
Commandments on the Courthouse Lawn and Elsewhere, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1477,
1480-83 (2005).
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the Convention itself; and (3) the erosion of the doctrine of the
"margin of appreciation" of states in applying the European
Convention.
Only after considering these components is it possible to
understand the ECHR's general evolutionary view of the freedom
of religion, the two principal features of which are (1) the
predominance of the needs of stable democratic societies in the
face of religious freedom; and (2) the idea of education as an
introduction to rational values, in contrast with religious values.
Section B below will discuss these last two principles in more
detail.
B. The European Court in Search of a Rationale: Neutrality,
Secularism, and a Civic Education
The ECHR has gone a long way in elaborating its ideal view
of religion and state intercourse, which it has repeatedly called
"neutrality."' Neutrality is an attitude that does not endorse or
prefer any religious denomination or belief and is implied by the
same religious freedom that the European Convention enforces,
especially in the field of public education.49 In the Lautsi decision
47 See Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International Protection of
Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 33, 99
(2002).
4 The milestones of the rationale of the European Court can be found in the
following decisions: Valsamis v. Greece, no. 21787/93, § 36, ECHR 1996-VI,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695888&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649 (in the field of education); Dahlab, httpi//cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=670930&poktal=hbkm&source=e
xternalbydoenumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; Folger0 v.
Norway, no. 15472/02, § 74, ECHR 2007, available at http://cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=819532&portal=hbkm&source=
externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; see also
Sahin v. Turkey, no. 44774/98, § 107, ECHR 2005-XI, available at http//
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=789023&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986
49; Dogru v. France, no. 27058/05, § 62, ECHR, available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=843927&portal=hbkm&sour
ce=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986 4 9 .
4 See Dahlab, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&docum
entId=670930&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8
6142BF01C1166DEA398649, § 2; Lautsi v. Italy, no. 30814/06, §§ 47(e), 57, ECHR,
[hereinafter Lautsi I] available at http-//cmiskp.echr.coe.intitkpl97/view.asp?
action=html&documentId=857725&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&ta
ble=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649, rev'd, Lautsi v. Italy [GC], §§ 47,
57, ECHR 2009, [hereinafter Lautsi II], available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intl
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("Lautsi 1")50 and other decisions that followed it, European
neutrality was shown to be quite similar to the American
separation of church and state in that both strive to maintain
some gap between religions and public institutions and duties."'
Lautsi I concerned the display of the crucifix in Italian public
schools,5 2 and it resonated widely" because it explicitly held that
the crucifix display was not only a violation of the "religious
freedom" of non-Catholic students, but was a violation of the
"neutrality" that the states are obliged to show toward all
religions.54 Indeed, even the Grand Chamber's decision ("Lautsi
IF), which took the opposite position and held that the crucifix
did not violate the European Convention, did not erase the
pivotal role of "neutrality"" but rather decreased its legal power.
The Grand Chamber maintained that neutrality is implied by
tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentld=883169&portal=hbkm&source=external
bydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
50 Lautsi I, http//cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId
=857725&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142
BF01C1166DEA398649.
5 See id. §§ 56-57; Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow v. Russia, no. 302/02, §§ 99,
119, ECHR, available at http/cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?action=html
&documentId=869647&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27
FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; Grzelak v. Poland, no. 7710/02, § 86, ECHR,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=86
9898&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BFO
1C1166DEA398649.
52 Lautsi I, §§ 56-57, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=857725&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649. After Lautsi I, other decisions made use
of "neutrality." See Jehovah's Witnesses of Moscow, §§ 99, 119, 181, http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=869647&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986
49; Grzelak, § 86, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&document
Id=869898&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB8614
2BF01C1166DEA398649.
5 According to some polls that followed the decision, eighty-four percent of
Italians endorse the display of the crucifix in public schools. Il crocefisso torna
davanti ai giudici europei di Strasburgo, ITALIA DALL'ESTERO (June 30, 2010) (It.),
http://italiadallestero.info/archives/9699 (trans. ItaliaDallEstero.info).
14 Luca P. Vanoni, I Simboli religiosi e la libertd di educare in Europa:
uniti nella diversitd o uniti dalla neutralitd?, ASSOCIAZIONE ITALIANA DEI
CosTITuzIoNALIsTI, (Feb. 7, 2010) (It.), http://www.associazionedeicostituzionalisti.
it/sites/default/files/tmpNanoni0l.pdf.
" Lautsi II, §§ 68-71, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.intltkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=883169&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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Article 9 of the European Convention, even though the
consequences of that neutrality can vary depending on the states'
cultural and legal backgrounds."6
Even though Lautsi II decreased the consequences of
neutrality and accepted the presence of religious symbols at
schools, other decisions still demand strong separation. In fact,
the ECHR has held that the Greek provision of a religious oath
for lawyers is inconsistent with religious liberty, even if lawyers
who do not belong to the Greek Orthodox majority are permitted
not to swear any oaths.5 7  Likewise, the ECHR has held that
mentioning religious affiliations on Turkish identity cards
violates the Euoprean Convention even if the religious
affiliations are voluntarily included."8
The use of the word "neutrality" itself, as well as its
description as the only means to protect religious freedom by
granting a distance between the religious and the institutional
realms, reveals the French roots of this trend in the ECHR's
jurisprudence. The necessity of keeping an appropriate distance
between faiths and governments comes from the French idea of
laicitd,9 which was endorsed by countries like Turkey."o
Nevertheless, it is hard to believe that the right to freedom
of religion embedded in the European Convention implies
neutrality. There are at least two reasons that make this claim
debatable.
First, there is no textual reference to neutrality or anything
similar in the European Convention. Article 9 of the European
Convention, which protects religious freedom, reads as follows:
5 See id. § 60.
* Alexandridis v. Greece, no. 19516/06, § 38, ECHR 2008, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=829215&porta
1=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01Cl166DEA
398649.
18 Iik v. Turkey, no. 21924/05, § 51-52, ECHR 2010, available at http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=861896&portal=hbkm&sour
ce=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
11 A recent endorsement of this conception of lalcit6 can be found in the
following documents, which was delivered by the official French body for cultural
integration: Projet de charte de la larcite dans les services publics, HAUT CONSEIL A
L'INTtGRATION (Jan. 2007), http://www.hei.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/AVISChartELaicite.
pdf.
0 See Rossella Bottoni, Brevi considerazioni sul principio di laicitd in turchia
alla luce dei recenti sviluppi, 2008 QUADERNI DI DIRITIO E POLITICA EccLEsIASTICA
431, 431-48; Talip Kucukcan, State, Islam, and Religious Liberty in Modern Turkey:
Reconfiguration of Religion in the Public Sphere, 2003 BYU. L. REV. 475,485-89.
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(1) Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in
worship, teaching, practice and observance.
(2) Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject
only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public
safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.6 1
There is no trace of an "establishment clause." Article 9 does not
discuss the relationship between church and state or how that
relationship must be shaped; it only states that every state must
guarantee freedom of religion.62 Even the records of the debate
that led to the shaping of Article 9 do not mention "neutrality" or
any other relationship models between church and state.
Second, if some meaning is to be attributed to the
"neutrality" principle, the most natural meaning is the exclusion
of any state official belief. But the opposite can be found in the
constitutional traditions of the state members of the Council of
Europe. 64  Some of them are undoubtedly secular-neutral,
according to the wording of the ECHR-such as the traditions of
France and Turkey.65  But others are quite different. For
61 European Convention, supra note 1, art.9.
62 Even the drafting records for Article 9 do not help; the participants agreed
quite easily on its wording, and there is no evidence that any of the drafters
wanted it to have a distinctive ideological shape. See European Commission of
Human Rights: Preparatory Work on Article 9 of the European Convention on
Human Rights, at 6, 9 (Aug. 16, 1956), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/
library/DIGDOC/Travaux/ECHRTravaux-ART9-DH%2856%2914-EN1338892.pdf
[hereinafter Preparatory Work].
63 See generally id.
See generally Alfred Stepan, The Multiple Secularisms of Modern Democracies
and Non-Democratic Regimes, in RETHINKING SECULARISM 114 (Craig Calhoun et al.
eds., 2011).
65 Needless to say, it is hard even to mention a bit of the enormous literature
about French secularism. See generally Michael. J. Perry, Why Religion in Politics
Does Not Violate la Conception Ambricaine de la Laicit6, 13 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 543 (2006) (sketching the differences between the American and the French
approaches to addressing the relationship between law and religion). On the French
constitutional relationship between religion and state, see Douglas Laycock,
Conference Introduction: American Religious Liberty, French Laicitg, and the Veil, 49
J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 21, 30 (2010). See generally Maurice Barbier, Towards a
Definition of French Secularism, http//www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/IMG/pdf/0205-
Barbier-GB-2.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011) (discussing the recent evolution of
secularism in France). For a discussion about Turkey's position on the religion-state
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example, the United Kingdom has an established church and the
head of the state is also the head of the church;6 6 or Norway,
which is officially Lutheran; 7 or Greece, which is Orthodox;' or
Ireland, which is famously Catholic." Many of these countries
bear evidence of their religious identity even in their
constitutional texts. For example, the Irish Constitution states
in part
In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all
authority and to Whom, as our final end, all actions both of men
and States must be referred,
We, the people of [Ireland],
Humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord,
Jesus Christ, Who sustained our fathers through centuries of
trial ... .70
Article 3 of the Greek Constitution similarly states that
The prevailing religion in Greece is that of the Eastern
Orthodox Church of Christ. The Orthodox Church of Greece,
acknowledging our Lord Jesus Christ as its head, is inseparably
united in doctrine with the Great Church of Christ in
Constantinople and with every other Church of Christ of the
same doctrine, observing unwaveringly, as they do, the holy
apostolic and synodal canons and sacred traditions. It is
autocephalous and is administered by the Holy Synod of serving
Bishops and the Permanent Holy Synod originating thereof and
assembled as specified by the Statutory Charter of the Church
in compliance with the provisions of the Patriarchal Tome of
June 29, 1850 and the Synodal Act of September 4, 1928."
relationship, see Niyazi Oktem, Religion in Turkey, 2002 BYU. L. REV. 371, 371;
Jos6 Casanova, Religion, European Secular Identities, and European Integration,
http://www.bpb.de/files/XLKRLX.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2011).
66 Act of Supremacy, 1534, reprinted in ENGLISH HISTORICAL REPRINTS 34, 34-
35 (William Johnston & Jean Browne Johnston eds., 1896).
6 GRUNNLOVEN [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814 (amended Feb. 20, 2007), art. 2
(Nor.), available at http//www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-
instrukser/Grunnloven-fra-1814/.
6 SYNTAGMA [CONSTITUTION] June 11, 1975 (amended May 27, 2008), art. 3
(Greece), available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-769 6-
49db-9148-f24dee6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf.
69 BUNREACHT NA HILREANN [CONSITUTION] July 1, 1937, pmbl. (Ir.), available
at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/upload/publications/297.pdf.
7o Id. The Irish Constitution was enacted in 1937. Id.
n1 SYNTAGMA [CONSTITUTION] June 11, 1975 (amended May 27, 2008), art. 3
(Greece), available at http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-
49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/001-156%20aggliko.pdf. The Greek Constitution was
enforced in 1975. Id.
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Finally, Article 2 of the Constitution of Norway states that "[tihe
Evangelical-Lutheran religion shall remain the official religion of
the State. The inhabitants professing it are bound to bring up
their children in the same."72
There is therefore little doubt that these countries did not
consider that neutrality is implied in the freedom of religion
article of the European Convention when they subscribed to it.73
If the ECHR is to maintain the principle of neutrality as one
of the cornerstones of its conception of religious freedom without
betraying the intentions of the states that subscribed to the
European Convention, it should restrain its implications and
utilize it as a mere substitute for religious freedom itself. This is
what Lautsi II appears to have done in depicting the Italian
model of the church and state relationship as neutral, although
Italian law contemplates the presence of the crucifix.
The shaping of the neutrality model of church and state can
take two alternative paths: (1) a clear endorsement of strict
neutrality, at the expense of the constitutional traditions of many
European countries and of their intentions at the time of the
drafting of the Convention; or (2) a milder conception of
neutrality, one that meets the features of diverse models of
church-state relationships, including, for instance, Great Britain
or Greece.
Finally, neutrality is at odds even with the ECHR's previous
jurisprudence-specifically when read against the ECHR's
endorsement of its member states' "margin of appreciation." The
72 GRUNNLOVEN [CONSTITUTION] May 17, 1814 (amended Feb. 20, 2007), art. 2
(Nor.), available at http://www.stortinget.no/no/Stortinget-og-demokratiet/Lover-og-
instrukser/Grunnloven-fra-1814/. The first mention of the Lutheran religion as the
official religion of Norway can be found in the original drafting of the Norway
Constitution, which was delivered in 1814. Id.
n The Greek Constitution, enforced in 1975, is more recent than the European
Convention, which was ratified by Greece in 1974. Compare SYNTAGMA
[CONSTITUTION] June 11, 1975 (amended May 27, 2008), art. 3 (Greece), available at
http//www.hellenicparliament.gr/UserFiles/f3c70a23-7696-49db-9148-f24dce6a27c8/
001-156%20aggliko.pdf, with Greece-Member State Data, COUNCIL OF EUROPE,
http://www.coe.intlportal/web/coe-portal/country/greece?dynLink=true&layoutId=
145&dlgroupId=10226&fromArticleId= (last visited Oct. 28, 2011). Nevertheless, all
the modern Greek Constitutions have defined the Orthodox Church as "dominant" in
Greece long before 1975, as acknowledged by the ECHR itself in the decision,
Kokkinakis v. Greece, no. 14307/88, § 14, ECHR 1993-A260-A, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695704&porta
l=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA
398649.
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"margin of appreciation" doctrine7 4 was elaborated by the ECHR
over the course of several decisions in order to address the
pluralism of member states' legislation in light of the unitary
European Convention.5 Under this doctrine, states should have
adequate space in shaping the liberties that are granted by the
European Convention according to their different legal
traditions, social circumstances, and cultural specificities."
The "margin of appreciation" is a device that protects both
the states' liberty and the role of the European Convention, and
it is an implicit admission that there is no specific or single model
that is embedded in the European Convention and to which the
states must conform. Therefore, the "margin of appreciation" is
in serious tension with any doctrine that demands strict
neutrality as a necessary consequence of the freedom of religion.
In affirming that the European Convention implies neutrality
while acknowledging that neutrality can take different shapes
depending on the cultural history of the individual member
states, Lautsi II restored a wide margin of appreciation to the
states but nevertheless drew the borders of that margin with the
limiting pen of neutrality.
The shaping of neutrality as a paradigm embedded in the
European Convention, as well as the pre-Lautsi II neglect of the
margin of appreciation doctrine, leads to the following conclusion:
The ECHR's attitude has been developing the meaning of the
article that protects freedom of religion at the expense of: (1) the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation; (2) the freedom of the
74 See Handyside v. United Kingdom, no. 5493/72, §§ 48-49, ECHR 1976-A24,
available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=
695376&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142B
F01C1166DEA398649 (elaborating on this concept); see also Young v. United
Kingdom, no. 7601/76; 7806/77, § 65, ECHR 1981-A44, available at http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=695485&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986
49.
7 See supra note 74 and accompanying text; 5ahin, § 110, http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=789023&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA39 8 6
49.
76 See, e.g., Onder Bakirciolgu, The Application of the Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine in Freedom of Expression and Public Morality Cases, 8 GER. L.J. 711, 711,
718 (2007).
n See Lautsi II, § 68, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=883169&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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state; and (3) the intention that many states had when they
signed the Convention. It is hard to believe that countries such
as the United Kingdom would have signed the European
Convention if their leaders had been aware that this would have
disqualified their constitutional regimes as clearly violating the
freedom of religion.
C. Separation for the Sake of the State
If one considers the ECHR's jurisprudence on religious
liberty as the leading definition of neutrality, it is apparent that
the ECHR has protected states against religions rather than vice
versa. In some decisions, freedom of religion has been used to
fight the legal influence of the religious majority of a country
over the minority. Some countries-such as Greece,78 St.
Marino," Norway,80 and, more recently, Italy4-were condemned
because they were judged as failing to respect people who did not
agree with the religious beliefs of the majority. In other
decisions, the ECHR affirmed religious liberty of individuals
against acts that forced them to simply reveal their own religious
beliefs.8 2
Nevertheless, it is hard to maintain that the ECHR is mostly
concerned with the protection of religious minorities and with
religious freedom. In fact, the opposite is often true. First, the
" Alexandridis, §§ 47-49, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=829215&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BFO1C1166DEA398649.
" Buscarini v. San Marino, no. 24645/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-1, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=696792&porta
1=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BFO1C1166DEA
398649.
8o Folgero, §§ 53-54, 100-02, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=819532&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
" Lautsi II, §§ 56-58, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentId=857725&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BFO1C1166DEA398649.
8 See, e.g., Alexandridis, §§ 51-53, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.
asp?action=html&documentId=829215&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber
&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649; Grzelak, §§ 88, 99-101, http://
cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentd=869898&portal=hbk
m&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA3986
49; lyik, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&documentId=86189
6&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF1C1
166DEA398649.
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ECHR has allowed the public display of religious symbols and
even the celebration of religious ceremonies during governmental
events. Second, it has affirmed that the display of personal
religious signs can be limited to protect society. Third, it has
held that even religious political parties can be suppressed if
their religious purposes endanger democratic societies.
On the first point, in Valsamis v. Greece, the court held that
religious ceremonies are acceptable alongside institutional
exhibitions." A student who was not a Greek Orthodox claimed
that Article 9 was violated when he was not exempted from
attending a public exhibition in which the Orthodox Church
played a strong part.' The ECHR dismissed the case,
maintaining that the participation of the official church of the
country was considered part of a broader manifestation of
patriotism, which could not be avoided by the students."
Therefore, the court applied the rationale that the majoritarian
religion is welcome if and because it supports the rhetoric of
patriotism, even if some individuals do not share the belief of the
majority.
Two decisions concerning Turkey help to shed some light on
the second and third points. Karaduman v. Turkey held that it is
consistent with the European Convention to prohibit the use of
the Muslim veil in photos that are used by public universities.
Under Karaduman, the religious practice of wearing the Muslim
headscarf can be prohibited in order to protect the stability and
the pluralism of the society.
Analogously, Refah v. Turkey involved the abolition of a
small party whose leaders publicly supported the restoration of
Shari'a in Turkey. This abolition was upheld by the
' Valsamis, §§ 31, 37, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=695888&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
' Id. § 22. The applicant was also arguing that the patriotic manifestation
contradicted her pacifist belief. Id.
85 Id. § 31.
86 Id.
8 Karaduman v. Turkey, App. No. 16278/90, 74 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep.
93, 93, 104, 109 (1993).
* Id. at 107-10.
89 Refah Partisi v. Turkey, nos. 41340/98, 41342/98, 41343/98, 41344/98,
[[ 120-122, 132-133, ECHR 2003-II, availble at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/
.asp?action=html&documentld=698813&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumbe
r&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
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constitutional court of that country and considered by the ECHR
to be consistent with the European Convention, which protects
the freedom of association." The ECHR believed that the
limitation of the freedom of association was consistent with the
need for a democratic and pluralistic society.9' Some leaders of
the party had openly declared that they were in favor of a
restoration of Muslim law, which contradicts the principles of
democratic and pluralistic states that the European Convention
fosters.9 2 But the party, which represented a minority of Turks,
did not mention the reintroduction of Shari'a in its statutes, nor
did it work concretely for the restoration of ancient Muslim
Law." The ECHR believed that some public speeches by its
members were enough to consider the party a menace for
Turkish democratic life.94
The ECHR's jurisprudence in the above decisions reflects the
court's goal to balance two specific concerns: the value of
neutrality as the constitutional device needed to protect religious
freedom, and the value of political and social stability. But the
latter can (1) legitimize public religious ceremonies, according
to Valsamis; (2) prevail over religious freedom, as in the
Karaduman decision; and (3) include strong limitations on the
freedom of association, according to Refah. The primary concern
seems, therefore, to be stability, rather than religious freedom.
" European Convention, supra note 1, art. 11 ("1. Everyone has the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including
the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests. 2. No
restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others. This article shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the
exercise of these rights by members of the armed forces, of the police or of the
administration of the State.").
91 Refah Partisi, §§ 95, 99, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=
html&documentId=698813&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69
A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
92 Id. §§ 120-23, 125, 132.
1 See id. §§ 120-22.
94 Id. §§ 131-32.
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Moreover, as Lautsi I asserted, the state's survival is to be
ensured not only through social stability but also through
education.95
In endorsing the concept of neutrality, Lautsi I was quite
explicit in its conception of religious education as contrasted with
civil education. According to the court, religious education can
conflict with a form of education that values criticism and debate,
which is necessary for the growth of human beings." When the
ECHR deals with religious neutrality of public education, it
stresses that "[p]ublic education must try to instil reflective
thinking in students"" in accordance with a specific conception of
public education,9 8 as if the influence of religious thought could
have a negative impact on the development of the students'
intellectual skills and not just on their religious choices.
The opposition between religious and intellectual education
is part of the cultural background against which Lautsi I was
built.99 The protection of religious education and the exposure of
students to religious symbols would be at the expense of not just
their religious freedom, but also their intellectual skills. 0 This
point was later reaffirmed by the dissenting opinion in Lautsi
H1.101
I See Lautsi II, §§ 47, 56, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action
=html&documentId=857725&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F
69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649.
* See id. § 56 (saying that the state should raise up students and endow them
with critical skills and maintaining that this would be inconsistent with the
presence of a religious symbols in classrooms: "[L]'6ducation publique ... doit
chercher A inculquer aux 616ves une pens6e critique.").
" See id. § 56 (author's translation).
9 PETER BERGE ET AL., RELIGIOUS AMERICA, SECULAR EUROPE?: A THEME AND
VARIATIONS 77 (2008) ("[It is the role of the State to create laique citizens ...
(emphasis omitted).
9 MARY ANN GLENDON, TRADITIONS IN TURMOIL ch.1, (2006) (reflecting on the
problematic role of education for contemporary democracies).
100 See Lautsi II, § 2, http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/view.asp?action=html&
documentld=883169&portal=hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27F
D8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649 (Malinverni, J., dissenting).
101 Id. ("The second sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 implies that the State,
in fulfilling the functions assumed by it in regard to education and teaching, must
take care that knowledge is conveyed in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner.
Schools should be a meeting place for different religions and philosophical
convictions, in which pupils can acquire knowledge about their respective thoughts
and traditions.").
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The decisions of the ECHR can therefore be logically
synthesized as follows: (1) neutrality is a device to grant religious
freedom, as seen in Karaduman;0n (2) neutrality is not just an
institutional attitude, but a requirement that can be imposed on
people as well as on political parties with evident religious goals
if these goals are considered inconsistent with the character of a
democratic society, as seen in Karaduman and Refah;0 3 and
(3) religious influence over youngsters can be limited in order to
protect their intellectual and civic growth, as in Lautsi 1.1o This
is why a religious element is allowed if it is embedded in a
patriotic manifestation. Because in such situations there is no
conflict between religious and civil values. 0 5 The former are at
the service of the latter.
The approach of the ECHR-which fluctuates between a
more rigid and a more flexible approach, as witnessed by the gap
between Lautsi I and II-derives from the belief that limitations
on the public display of religious signs protect states as well as
citizens from religion and that this is necessary to secure the
stability of contemporary, pluralistic democracies. 0 6  At least a
part of the ECHR's justices are convinced that in order to protect
democratic society it is necessary to insulate it'0 7 from the effects
of religious practices and from people's religiosity.'o
102 See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
103 See supra notes 87, 91 and accompanying text.
10 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
106 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
106 See Carolyn Evans, Religious Education in Public Schools: An International
Human Rights Perspective, 8 HuM. RTs. L. REV. 449, 455 (2008); Marco Parisi,
Insegnamento religioso, neutralitet dell'istruzione pubblica ed educazione alla
cittadinanza democratica: il caso Folger0 contro Norvegia, 2009 QUADERNI DI
DIRITTO E POLITICA ECCLESIASTICA 729, 736 n.18, 741, 747-48.
107 See Pasquale Annicchino, How Wide Is the Margin? The United States
Supreme Court and the European Court of Human Rights on Religion in Public
Schools, 5 DROIT ET RELIGIONS 301, 303 (2010) (commenting to Lautsi I and
reflecting the conflictive imagery between religion and democracy, Annicchino stated
that "We assume ... that in a liberal democracy public schools are a place of
cultivation and education and the place of the conveyance of a basic cultural identity
in a community. Public schools have been in fact traditionally understood as a
necessary mean to preserve republican institutions and to create a political
community.").
108 This trend can be found also in some recommendations released by the
Council of Europe, Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1202 (1993) on Religious
Tolerance in a Democratic Society 16 and Eur. Parl. Ass., Recommendation 1804
(2007) State, Religion, Secularity and Human Rights 4 (endorsing the principle of
646 [Vol. 85:627
2011] (EUROPEAN) STARS OR (AMERICAN) STRIPES
CONCLUSION
The evolution of the European and American models of
protection of religious freedom reveal some common features.
First, the increasing importance of the European Convention and
its institutions will likely have some effect on the domestic
protection of religious freedom and the relationship between
church and state in the countries that signed the European
Convention. This resembles the American achievement of a
unified standard of the right of religious freedom. Second, the
creation of a common model of protection of religious freedom
was not the original intent of the countries that signed the
European Convention. The European Convention was meant to
provide a common framework in which every state could find
its own way to protect fundamental rights. The original
understanding of the European Convention has much in common
with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. One of the
goals of the First Amendment was to protect the states' freedom
in shaping their own models of protection of religious freedom
and of interaction between church and state. Third, the
achievement of a more uniform protection of religious freedom
has been largely a product of case law, both in the United States
and in the European Convention's context. The Supreme Court
has been playing a strong role in reshaping the meaning of the
First Amendment through the decades. The ECHR has played
an important role in enforcing the interpretation of Article 9 of
the Convention, which has led to a developed model of religious
freedom.
Nevertheless, there are several differences between the
routes that the two courts have taken. The Supreme Court has
focused on the protection of religious freedom even if the models
that inspired it have changed through time.'09 Conversely, the
European Convention has endorsed a debatable extension of the
original text to mandate neutrality as a corollary to religious
freedom. This Article expresses doubt about whether the ECHR
has protected only religious freedom through neutrality, because
separation between church and state in order to keep religion distant from political
and social life).
1" In recent years, there have been huge debates about the tasks of education,
precisely with reference to religion. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, "God Is Dead
and We Have Killed Him!": Freedom of Religion in the Post-Modern Age, 1993 BYU
L. REV. 163, 172, 174, 176, 183-86; Conkle, supra note 2, at 5-9.
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the court has repeatedly protected society from religion and has
considered religious identity a menace for democratic societies,
threatening their own stability.
